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STATUTORY REGULATION OF ASSIGNMENTS
FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS
AMONG creditors, the race is to the swift. The first to impress a lien upon
the property of the debtor may satisfy his demand in full, to the exclusion
of the less alert. While statutes have made consistent inroads upon this
common-law doctrine, and the bankruptcy, assignment and recording acts
evince an unmistakable public policy in favor of equality, the rule of the
"race for diligence" stubbornly persists.' From the time that the first rumor
of imminent insolvency is spread by the credit bureau, creditors are con-
stantly jockeying for position. The harassed debtor may be persuaded to
make over a chattel mortgage to a favored few, or to execute a deed in trust
for preferred creditors, or to convey all or part of his assets in payment of
a single debt. While the federal bankruptcy statute restores equality and
1. The justice and desirability of the equality notion have recently been questioned.
See Sturges, A Proposed State Collection Act (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1055.
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makes every such transfer by an insolvent debtor an act of bankruptcy, the
filing of claims in the bankruptcy court is a costly and dilatory remedy for
the unpreferred creditors. A creditor's bill for a receivership possesses
similar disadvantages.
More prudent creditors have attempted to reach an amicable arrangement
outside of court.2 By persuading the debtor to execute a general assignment
to a reputable, non-profit adjustment bureau,3 creditors of a failing retail
merchant frequently secure more than double the percentage of dividends
that would trickle to them from bankruptcy.4 Since a debtor is willing to
attempt friendly adjustment long before he is resigned to the stigma of
bankruptcy proceedings,5 his estate generally is in a much more solvent
condition than is usual when the wreckage of the business is finally dumped
into the bankruptcy court.6 Furthermore, the elimination of court costs and
other expenses and the efficiency of the liquidating personnel have reduced
the cost of administering an assignment to far below the toll exacted by the
bankruptcy tribunal.7  Occasionally, after an assignment to an adjustment
bureau, creditors have been persuaded to agree to a composition permitting
the bureau to operate the enterprise. The result quite frequently has been
the elimination of management errors, payment of all debts, and the return
of the business to the debtor as a solvent going concern 8
2. See Sturges, Commercial Arbitration or Court Application of Common Law Rules
of Marketing? (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 40; Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of In-
solvent Estates: A Study of Recent Cases (1930) 78 U. oF PA. L REv. 293; Douglas
and Marshall, A Factual Study of Bankruptcy Administration and Some Suggestions
(1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 25, 42.
3. Of particular significance are the assignments conducted by the seventy-two ad-
justment bureaus affiliated with and supervised by the National Association of Credit
Men. Each bureau is a non-profit making, incorporated unit in charge of a manager and
manned by heavily bonded, salaried employees who are specialists in the field of liquid-
ating insolvent estates and rehabilitating embarrassed debtors. Billig, What Price Banh-
ruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment" (1929) 14 CoRT.. L. Q. 413.
4. In 1930, some $20,000,000 of assets were realized in friendly adjustment, out of
liabilities totaling $57,000,000. During the same year, $42,600,000 was received by cred-
itors from bankruptcy proceedings, in which liabilities totaled $293,000,000. SxorW -
ENING oF PRocEDuPX IN THE JUDICIAL SYsTEm, SEN. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932) (report of the Attorney General on Bankruptcy Law and Practice) at 186, here-
inafter cited as STRENGTHENING OF PRoCsnurt.
5. Debtors generally feel that there is less of a stigma attached to an assignment
than to bankruptcy proceedings, and that afterwards a new business venture may more
successfully be launched. DoNovAN, AmINSaTATION or BANKRuPr EsTATEs (1931) 153.
6. Firth, The Critical Period Before Bankruptcy (1932) 41 YAIE L J. 853; Com-
ment (1937) 46 YA.E L. J. 1177, 1179, 1187.
7. Billig, supra note 2. This study analyzes forty contemporaneous liquidations of
small Pittsburgh and Cleveland retail stores with almost identical schedules of assets
and liabilities. Half were liquidated by means of assignments to adjustment bureaus,
while the others went through bankruptcy. The assignment cases were conducted at less
than half the cost of the bankruptcy proceedings.
8. See Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1177, 1187. See p. 949 infra.
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Although assignments for the benefit of creditors are regulated by com-
prehensive legislation in thirty-six states, in only a handful of jurisdictions
do the directors of friendly adjustment bureaus make any attempt to comply
with the statutes. 9 The state enactments, for the most part of Civil War
vintage, offer a burdensome and expensive procedure. Observance of the
detailed statutory requirements would forfeit the out-of-court atmosphere
which is apparently the chief merit of the friendly adjustment system.10 Nor
do the statutes generally compensate for the disadvantages of compliance
by dissipating the weaknesses inherent in the common law assignment. Since
the debtor may defy creditors and select his own assignee, the door to fraud
is open. Without legislative reinforcement, the assignee's powers are strictly
limited. He cannot bring suit to set aside fraudulent conveyances made by
the assignor,1 ' nor can he destroy preferences obtained prior to the assign-
ment.1 2 Furthermore state legislation cannot grant the debtor a full discharge,
nor can it prevent any assignment, if made while the debtor is insolvent, from
being an act of bankruptcy. For four months thereafter, the assigned estate
runs the danger of being cast into the bankruptcy court upon petition of three
non-consenting creditors. 13
Movements for legislative reform have recently sprung from two sources.
Renovation of state assignment statutes has been effected during the past
two years in Arizona, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin 14 Mean-
while, some of the proposals for overhauling the National Bankruptcy Act
have contemplated inclusion of assignments within the purview of federal
regulation. 15 But while the advocates of friendly adjustment seek particular
statutory advantages, they are afraid that either sort of new legislation will
render the administration of an assignment too completely an in-court pro-
ceeding.16 Closer regulation for the purpose of preventing fraud will, it is
9. This and subsequent uncredited statements are based upon communications to
the YALE LAW JOURNAL from forty-three adjustment bureaus located throughout the
country, January 14-February 10, 1938.
Operative assignment statutes exist in all states except Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Oregon and Washington. In some of these jurisdictions, statutes are still on the books,
but have been suspended by the local courts during the pendency of the National Bank-
ruptcy Act.
10. ST ENGTHENING OF PaocEDua, op. cit. supra note 4, at 71.
11. See p. 956 infra.
12. See p. 957 infra.
13. Section 3(a) (5) of the National Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAr. 546 (1898), 44 STAT.
662 (1926), 11 U. S. C. §21(a)(5) (1934).
14. ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Courtright, Supp. 1935) § 176; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1936) § 5278b; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) § 3946; Wis. LAws (1937) c. 431.
15. Particularly the Hastings-Michener Bill, S. 3866, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
See STRENGTENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 68.
16. See Joint Hearings before Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary
on S. 3866, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 729.
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feared, inevitably make honest adjustments slower and more costly. In dis-
cussing the dilemma faced by the legislators, this comment will examine the
effectiveness of present law in assisting honest assignments and forestalling
fraudulent ones, as a basis for considering what statutory changes are desir-
able, and whether they should be effectuated by national or local regulation.
EXECUTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT
A general assignment freezes the rights of the parties as effectively as
other insolvency proceedings; individual creditors are prevented from levy-
ing upon the assets transferred.'7 A debtor has an inherent common law
right to execute an assignment,' 8 independent of statute and without the
consent of creditors.19 Upon execution and delivery of the instrument to
the assignee, traditionally a trust is created. Since the assignment is rarely
of property disproportionately greater in value than the pre-existing debts
thereby secured, no one can attack the instrument as a fraudulent convey-
ance. 21 In Massachusetts, however, a series of early nineteenth century
decisions, based upon the absence of "equity powers" in the state courts
at that time, held that an assignment, being equitable in nature, could not
operate to defeat a subsequent common law writ of attachment brought by
a non-consenting creditor.2 ' Several other courts, unhampered by any ab-
sence of equity jurisdiction, have mistakenly adopted the Massachusetts rule,
and upon attack by a dissenting creditor, declare the assignment wholly void
and permit the assailant to recover in full.2 In some of these states the
rigor of this rule has been eased; creditors are conclusively presumed to
17. GLENN, LI QImAToN (1935) § 110. But cf. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v.
Philadelphia Girard Nat. Bank, 33 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
18. Brashear v. West, 7 Pet 608 (U. S. 1833).
19. Brainard v. Fitzgerald, 3 Cal. (2d) 157, 44 P. (2d) 336 (1935); Damask-us v.
McCarty Johnson Heating Co., 88 Colo. 279, 295 Pac. 490 (1931); Brockton Shoe Mfg.
Co. v. Schenkman, 146 Misc. 119, 261 N. Y. Supp. 740 (1932); Utah Ass'n of Credit
Men v. McConnell, 50 Utah 531, 167 Pac. 817 (1917) ; Mayfield Woolen Mills v. Good-
rich & Martineau Co., 189 Wis. 406, 207 N. W. 954 (1926).
20. See § 3 of the Umrom FRA DuLwrr CoNEmyAcz Acr. The assignment cannot
be destroyed unless made with actual intent to defraud (§ 7), or unless no fair consid-
eration has been given. Security for a pre-existing debt is declared fair consideration
(§3).
21. Widgery v. Haskell, 5 Mass. 144 (1809) ; Stevens v. Bell, 6 Mass. 338 (1810);
29 I-nv. I. REv. 449 (1910). In England, the assignment is ineffective until at least
one creditor accepts. Garrard v. Lauderdale, 3 Sir. 1 (Ch. 1830).
22. Roesch and Sons v. Mumford, 230 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916) ; In re Hall, 25 F.
(2d) 518 (W. D. Pa. 1928) ; Lubinsky v. Hoffman, 158 Misc. 261, 284 N. Y. Supp. 549
(Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 246 App. Div. 803, 285 N. Y. Supp. 1074 (1st Dep't 1936). In
Massachusetts, the trust is declared valid at least to a sum equal to the claims of assent-
ing creditors. A dissenter may attach only the balance. Dunham Bros. v. Gordon, 289
Mass. 502, 194 N. F_ 675 (1935).
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have assented to statutory assignments.2 But even in these jurisdictions,
should the instrument fail to accord exactly with the details required by the
legislature, the assignment can be destroyed by any non-consenting creditor.24
Statutory regulation has afforded another ground for attacking friendly
adjustments, for apart from the issue of consent, there are recurring pro-
visions that all assignments must comply in all particulars with the assign-
ment statute-if not, the instrument is void.25 The laws commonly require
recording of the assignment, a complete inventory, a schedule of debts, and
the posting of a bond by the assignee. Notice of the assignment must be
mailed to all creditors. Fraudulent or preferential conveyances to collusive
assignees are thus discouraged, but since the estate can be liquidated more
cheaply without filing under the statute and thus becoming subject to other
cumbersome provisions, 26 many honest assignments to adjustment bureaus
are also endangered by the invalidating clause. But because invalidation shuts
out most creditors by permitting the attacker to recover in full,2 7 many
courts, squeezing through almost imperceptible loopholes in the statute,28
have upheld non-complying but honest assignments against all attack,2 D and
have compromised in cases of actual fraud by turning the estate over to a
receiver for equal distribution among all claimants.30 Such decisions rely upon
the familiar rationale that the statute is not mandatory, but directory. Wis-
consin seems to have solved the problem in more direct fashion by providing
that no assignment is to be declared void for failure to observe statutory
23. Cf. IOWA CODE (1935) § 1270; MONTANA REV. CODES ANN. (Anderson & Mc-
Farland, 1935) § 8612. See Eicher v. Baird, 204 Iowa 188, 215 N. W. 236 (1927).
24. See cases cited supra note 22.
25. ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Courtright, Supp. 1935) § 176; CAL. Cmv. CoDD (Deer-
ing, 1933) § 3451; Mxcn. Coup. LAWS (1929) § 15352; NED. Comp. STAT. (1929) § 6-101;
N.J. ComP. STAT. (1937) § 2:34-5; OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 10029; S. D. C MP.
LAWS (1929) § 2049; VT. Puu. LAWS (1933) § 2555; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936)
§ 5278b; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) § 3946.
26. See note 9, sumra, pp. 954, 958, 959, infra.
27. Williams v. Banana Dist. Co., 59 F. (2d) 645 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Haverhill
Shoe Novelty Co. v. Leader Shoe Co., 87 N. H. 366, 180 At. 242 (1935). See note 44,
in fra.
28. For a particularly strained construction based on ingenious refinements, see
Brainard v. Fitzgerald, 3 Cal. (2d) 157, 44 P. (2d) 336 (1935). The result of the case,
however, is not to be criticized.
29. Failure to record: Hopfan v. Knauth, 156 Misc. 545, 282 N. Y. Supp. 219 (Mun.
Ct. 1935); it re Freeman, 35 F. (2d) 952 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929). Assignee not a resi-
dent: Brown Shoe Co. v. Shor, 56 S. W. (2d) 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Failure to
file bond: Pobreslo v. Boyd, 210 Wis. 20, 242 N. W. 725 (1932) ; Wasserman v. Ray-
nor's Fur Corp., 137 Misc. 872, 244 N. Y. Supp. 110 (City Ct., 1930); In re Freeman,
supra. Failure to give notice to creditors: Isaacson v. Davis, 127 Me. 398, 143 Atl. 788
(1928). Failure to file schedule of creditors: Bertenshaw v. Klag, 117 Kan. 176, 231
Pac. 73 (1924). Failure to annex inventory: Pobreslo v. Boyd, supra; Newman v. Cle-
ment, 70 S. W. (2d) 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
30. Murray Bros. v. Macdnac Circuit Judge, 241 Mich. 312, 216 N. W. 914 (1928).
But cf. Williams v. Banana Dist. Co., 59 F. (2d) 645 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
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requirements; instead, the assignee, upon petition of any creditor, can be
compelled to comply with the terms of the law.31
An assignment which provides for an extension and continuation of the
business runs the danger of further attack. When the instrument is executed,
debtor and creditors may both have hopes of a subsequent composition through
which liabilities will be scaled down and the enterprise continued. Many
states therefore allow the assignee to terminate the assignment whenever an
accord has been reached.32 But assignments which contemplate an extended
period of creditor management are hampered by the common law notion that
a provision in the assignment deed authorizing the assignee to continue the
business is illegal as tending to delay and defraud creditors.3m This doctrine
has been expressly codified in four states34 While five jurisdictions have
revamped their laws to permit continued operation of the enterprise, efforts
at composition by means of an assignment in other jurisdictions must be
abandoned if the assent of all creditors cannot immediately be obtained.
Consents are not impossible to marshal, for adjustment bureaus have had
substantial success in reorganizing small businesses through assignments to
which all creditors have agreed. 0  Statutory prohibition of an extension
clause is then unimportant, for there is no one who can attack the assign-
ment deed.
No assignment is completely immune from attack until four months after
its execution, for until that time three non-consenting creditors may throw
the estate into bankruptcy. 37 Although it might be expected that friendly
adjustment would receive a tremendous impetus through abolition of the
"four-months" provision, the advisability of outright repeal seems dubious.
31. Wis. Laws (1937) c. 431, § 128:02(2). Cf. PA. STAT. Am. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 39, § 40. The court reached a similar result without statutory aid in Bertenshaw v.
KYag, 117 Kan. 176, 231 Pac. 73 (1924). But cf. Bernstein v. Raff, 140 Misc. 353, 230
N. Y. Supp. 694 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
32. See, e.g., Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) § 95; N. j. Rrv. STAT. (1937) § 2:34-22;
N. Y. DEmoR & CarnrroR LAW, art. 2, § 15(14).
33. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Schmidt, 273 N. W. 497 (Neb. 1937) ; Roberts
Co. v. Hopkins, Inc., 6 N. _. (2d) 837 (M.ass. 1937). The cases are collected in (1921)
23 A. L. R. 199. But the business may apparently be continued under a trust mortgage
which preserves to the debtor an equity of redemption. Samuels v. Charles F. Fogg Co.,
258 Mass. 402, 155 N. E. 429 (1927). And a brief continuation for conservation pur-
poses, in order to effect a better liquidation, is unobjectionable. Rodgers v. Boise Ass'n
of Credit Men, 33 Idaho 513, 196 Pac. 213 (1921).
34. CAr- rv. CODE (Deering, 1937) §3457; OreA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 10029;
S. D. Con. LAws (1929) § 2048; UrAH REv. STAT. AN. (1933) § 5-0-2.
35. Permission of the court is always required. Momrr. Rmv. Cos Aim. (Anderson
& McFarland, 1935) § 8635; N. J. Rnv. STAT. (1937) § 2:34-15; N. Y. DEMror & Cnsn-
rron LAw § 15(2) ; Onio GENi. CoDE ANN. (Page, 1926) § 11125; V. VA. CODM A.NN.
(Michie, 1937) § 3946(13).
36. See Comment (1937) 46 YAM L. J. 1177, 1187.
37. Section 3a. 30 STAT. 546 (1898), 44 STAT. 662 (1926), 11 U. S. C. § 21(a)
(1934).
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Adjustment bureaus report that the estates which they administer are very
rarely tossed into bankruptcy by recalcitrant minorities. 8 On the other hand,
the bureaus themselves quite often recommend that petitions be filed against
debtors who have transferred their property to assignees of doubtful fidelity
to creditors. The threat of bankruptcy is the most powerful weapon credi-
tors possess when it becomes necessary to forestall a fraudulent assignor.
The loss occasioned when honest assignments are unfortunately put into
the bankruptcy court is probably overbalanced by the number of dishonest
transfers trapped by the same provision.
It would, however, be possible to emasculate the power of strike creditors
against an honest assignee, and still retain positive control over fraudulent
assignments. Instead of permitting three creditors with claims totalling $500
to file a petition, the federal act could be amended to require application by
a majority of creditors in number 'or amount, or some showing of fraud,
before the debtor could be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon a general
assignment for creditors.8 9 The proposed Chandler Bill for renovating the
bankruptcy act definitely steps in this direction by setting up a procedure
permitting escape from the four-months provision when a majority of credi-
tors have agreed to a composition, the terms of which are approved by the
bankruptcy court.40 If majority rule were also applied by federal mandate
to liquidation assignments, the heyday of the nuisance creditor would be
over.
The debtor's power to immunize his assets by way of assignment carries
with it one disadvantage, not present in bankruptcy or receivership, which
has necessitated further statutory control. At common law, the debtor pos-
sessed a second inherent right-the privilege to prefer creditors. 41 Georgia
and a few states have codified this common-law rule and either expressly
or by necessary implication permit priorities in an assignment.42 But most
legislatures, persuaded that the assignor's power to immunize his assets
should not be abused by allowing him to single out particular beneficiaries,
have expressly prohibited general assignments which include preferences.
Several of these statutes declare the whole assignment absolutely void.43 The
preferred creditors are thus deprived of their advantage, only to have the
priority bestowed upon the first unpreferred claimant alert enough to attack
38. See note 9, supra.
39. Cf. Comment (1937) 46 YALz L. J. 1177, 1189; Joint Hearings before Subcom-
mittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 3866, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 702.
40. See Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1177, 1188.
41. McMullin v. Keogh-Doyle Meat Co., 96 Colo. 298, 42 P. (2d) 463 (1934).
42. GA. CODE (1933) § 28-301; MoNT. Rzv. CoDES AxN. (Anderson & McFarland,
1935) 9H 8617, 8620; UTAH REv. STAT. AxN. (1933) § 5-0-20. Compare § 3451 of CAT_
Civ. CoDE (Deering, 1937) with § 3457. In addition, a few statutes (Ark., Miss., and
R. I.) make no mention of preferences, while twelve states have no assignment laws in
effect at all. Thus preferential assignments may still be valid in at least eighteen states.
43. Din. Rsv. CoDE (1935) § 5282; FLA. Comp. GEN. Lkws ANN. (Skillman, 1927)
96752; N. J. Rzv. STAT. (1937) §2:34-1; S. C. CoDE (1932) § 9106.
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the instrument and levy upon the property."4 Other acts include a much
sounder provision: the preference itself is destroyed, but the rest of the
assignment is salvaged and administered by the court as a trust for all credi-
tors.45 Since such regulation cannot harm honest adjustments, a similar
amendment should doubtless be adopted in all jurisdictions.
Lawyers have devised several methods of evading the prohibition of prefer-
ences in general assignments. Instead of executing an assignment, an in-
solvent may safely make over to named creditors a mortgage, which, although
an act of bankruptcy,6 cannot usually be converted by other claimants into
a general assignment for creditors.47 In only a few states is the preference
forestalled by laws permitting other creditors to attack the conveyance and
transform it into a common trust fund.48 In such jurisdictions, a mortgage,40
payment of a debt,5 0 an outright transfer of property,," and a change of
beneficiary under a life insurance policy 52 have each been held to operate
as a general assignment. But should the lien be for a new consideration,
and not merely to secure an antecedent debt, the transfer is good, at least
to the extent of the new consideration, against all the world.1'
44. Virginia Trust Co. v. Pharr Estates, Inc., 206 N. C. 894, 175 S. E. 186 (1934);
Jarvis v. Webber, 196 Cal. 86, 236 Pac. 138 (1925).
45. Ai. CoD DAm. (Michie, 1928) § 8040; Anm DG. STAT. (Cravrford & Moses,
1919) § 489; Kiq. GEN. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 60, § 1301; Ky. SEAT. (Carroll, 1936) § 74;
Mo. STAT. AxsN. (Vernon, 1932) § 5269; On1.A. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 10026, but see
Minshall v. Sanders, 175 Okla. 1, 51 P. (2d) 940 (1936); Rs. STAT. Ar. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 39 § 1; TExN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 7787; Tm. AnN. Rxv. Cxv.
STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 261; VA. CoDD Am;. (Michie, 1936) § 5278.
46. Section 3(a) (2) of the National Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 546 (1S93), 44 STAT.
662 (1926), 11 U. S. C. §21(a)(2) (1934).
47. Metzler v. Foster Holding Co., 5 Cal. (2d) 278, 54 P. (2d) 447 (1936) ; Royal
Palm Cemetery Co. v. Smith, 117 Fla. 255, 157 So. 495 (1934) ; Nelson v. Poss, 172 Minn.
149, 214 N. W. 787 (1927); Stirling v. Logue, 154 Miss. 812, 123 So. 2 (1929);
Phillips v. Phillips, 53 N. D. 66, 204 N. NV. 935 (1925); James v. Lederer-Strauss &
Co., 32 Wyo. 377, 233 Pac. 137 (1925).
48. A". CoE AN. (Michie, 1928) §8040; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) § 1910;
N. C. CoD ANNz. (Michie, 1935) § 1609. Cf. PA. STAT. Ami. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 39
§Z2
49. Mainous v. Brown Shoe Co., 222 Ky. 25, 299 S. NV. 108 (1927); State Bank
of Stearns v. Stephens, 265 Ky. 615, 97 S. NV. (2d) 553 (1936). CI. Covan v. Dale,
189 N. C. 684, 128 S. E. 155 (1925). In Farmer's Banking & Trust Co. v. Tarboro Co.,
188 N. C. 177, 124 S. E. 155 (1924) the court arrived at the anomalous conclusion that
a chattel mortgage could be converted into an assignment, but vas invalid in any case
since it did not comply with the details of the assignment statute. This result is criti-
cized in Comment (1937) 15 N. C. L. REv. 267.
50. May v. Mahers, 233 ALa. 654, 172 So. 907 (1937).
51. Huff v. Russell, 267 Ky. 515, 102 S. NV. (2d) 984 (1937) ; Katz v. Earl & John
Scott, 229 Ky. 738, 17 S. W. (2d) 1024 (1929).
52. Inre Huffs Estate, 299 Pa. 200, 149 At. 179 (1930).
53. Commissioner of Banks v. Turnage, 202 N. C. 485, 163 S. E. 451 (1932). Cf.
Bankruptcy Act, Section 67 (d), 30 STAT. 564 (1898), 36 STAT. 842 (1910), 11 U. S. C.
§ 107(d) (1934).
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Since the statutes have been interpreted as not applying to assignments
of but a portion of a debtor's property, preferences may also be effected by
a series of partial assignments." Unless the partial transfers are too close
together in time, 55 the court will not regard them as subterfuge, nor will it
convert all the conveyances into one trust for creditors. 0 Statutory control
of such transfers has been secured by providing that every assignment, how-
ever expressed, be construed to operate upon all of the debtor's non-exempt
property.57
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE
The Assignee. Crucial to the success of the assignment is the selection of
a competent liquidator. An assignee of doubtful fidelity to creditors may be
lax in allowing questionable claims, in collecting assets, and in setting aside
prior fraudulent conveyances made by the debtor. He may procrastinate,
both to get the estate safely past the four-month bar to bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, and to build up sizeable fees for himself. In the traditional con-
ception of an assignment, however, the debtor creates a trust for creditors
and as settlor, nominates his own trustee. While in many cases, the assignor
is persuaded to assign to a responsible adjustment bureau, he often prefers
to choose an attorney, relative or preferred claimant. Despite the insolvent's
obvious opportunity to jeopardize the interests of all creditors by a fraudu-
lent assignment to a friendly assignee, statutory reform has been slow.
Regulatory legislation has been of three types. The new West Virginia
statute establishes minimum qualifications for the assignee, forbidding an
assignment to the debtor's relative, creditor, attorney, agent or employee."
Several states go further and forbid the assignor any voice in the selection
of the liquidator. California and Nebraska provide that the assignment shall
be made in the first instance to the sheriff of the county, whose duty it shall
be to call a conference of creditors. At the meeting, a majority of the claim-
ants in number and amount elect a trustee, and the sheriff turns the estate
over to him.5" In South Carolina, the debtor is free to select his own assignee,
but creditors may meet and select an agent of their own to administer the
property side by side with the representative of the debtor. The concurrence
of both delegates is made a prerequisite to any action toward liquidation.10
54. Jacobson v. Newman, 254 Mich. 555, 236 N. W. 861 (1931); Smith v. Allen,
144 Ore. 261, 24 P. (2d) 1043 (1933); Orloff v. Pester, 143 Misc. 685, 257 N. Y. Supp.
111 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Radford v. Ewing, 66 S. W. (2d) 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
55. Cf. Peed v. Elliott, 134 Ind. 536, 34 N. E. 319 (1893).
56. Dadeville Oil Co. v. Hicks, 184 Ala. 367, 63 So. 970 (1913). See cases cited
supra note 54.
57. Nzn. ComP. STAT. (1929) § 6-102; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 39 § 2;
Tx. ANN. Rsv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 261. See Pennsylvania Trust Co. v,
Billman, 61 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1932).
58. W. VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1937) § 3946 (12).
59. CAL. Civ. Cove (Deering, 1937) § 3449; NEB. ComP. STAT. (1929) § 6-105, 110.
60. S. C. CoDE (1932) § 9097.
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Under a third legislative system, the debtor is permitted to select his
own assignee, but the creditors are given greater powers of removal. In the
absence, of statuie, a creditor is limited to the usual remedy of a ccstui que
trust: he can, if he alleges specific wrongful acts, 1 petition in equity' for
removal of the assignee. But since speed is paramount in liquidation, the
trial delay incident to such a procedure ordinarily would be fatal. Although
nothing can be done to lessen the difficulty of proving mismanagement, a
dozen legislatures have emancipated creditors from the rules applicable to
ordinary trust beneficiaries. In some of these states, a majority of creditors
in number and amount may remove the assignee for any reason, and petition
the court to appoint another. -62 Other laws go even further and permit
creditors to select the new assignee themselves. 3
One weakness runs through these methods of creditor election and removal.
It is not improbable than many fictitious claims will be included in the
schedule annexed to the assignment, especially when the debtor's record is
so poor that creditors insist upon selecting their own liquidator. Trumped-
up debts *to relatives and obligations inflated in order to prefer creditors
must be eliminated before any effective election can be held, for otherwise
the debtor may be able to control a majority of claims in number and amount,
and put his own nominee in office. Before an assignee can be selected to
administer the estate it may be necessary to hold lengthy court hearings
for the purpose of weeding out fraudulent debts.
This dilatory process might be obviated by permitting the sheriff, clerk or
judge to make summary allowance and disallowance of all claims for the
single purpose of selecting an assignee. No appeal would be permitted, but
the determinations would not be of any weight when the claims were later
more fully examined for purposes of distribution. Yet the success of any
method of creditor selection is dubious. Similar elections in bankruptcy
practice have been plagued by unscrupulous proxy-seekers and fee-chasing
attorneys.64 Moreover, unless the debtor and most creditors have come to
an amicable understanding, the efficiency of the assignment method will be
so far diminished that it would be preferable to invoke bankruptcy proceed-
ings, where fraud can be more readily uncovered.
In addition to their powers of election and removal, creditors in all but
five states03 are protected by a statutory requirement that the assignee shall
61. Enterprise Fixture Co. v. Lieberman, 240 App. Div. 214, 269 N. Y. Supp. 219
(1st Dep't 1934).
62. AiA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 10412; CoLo. Coup'. LAws (1921) § 6253;
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 1614; UTAH Rzv. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 5-0-17.
63. IOWA CoDE (1935) § 12745; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (1935) § 60-1344; N. J.
R.v. STAT. (1937) § 2:34-41; OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1926) § 11096; VA. CODz
ANN. (Michie, 1936) § 5278c; NV. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) § 3946(8).
64. See Comment (1937) 46 YAXm L. J. 1177, 1193.
65. In Georgia and Rhode Island, an accounting is not required by the statute. Cali-
fornia and Vermont demand an accounting to the court only on petition of a creditor.
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account to the court for all receipts and disbursements. A referee appointed
for this purpose conducts a detailed examination, takes testimony, and certi-
fies a complete record of his findings to the court,66 which usually confirms
the report in a summary fashion. But the expense and delay of this process
is unfortunately great. 7 Although the referee is limited to a fixed percentage-
fee plus his expenses, the latter item can be made very lucrative by long
hearings and voluminous records. Moreover, a referee often suggests the
waiver of statutory fees, and the parties are obliged to consent rather than
incur his rancor and risk additional obstruction. It is because the money
and time consumed by a compulsory accounting often eat away a substantial
portion of the assets, that friendly adjustment by way of an assignment has
almost invariably taken place outside the statute.
While some of the expense could be eliminated by abolishing the fee plan
for referees and establishing a salary system instead,68 it is doubtful whether
creditors derive sufficient advantage out of any compulsory accounting to
compensate for its inefficiency. The requirement is obviously superfluous
when the assignee is one of the reputable, non-profit adjustment bureaus
which have been permitted by creditors to liquidate $20,000,000 of assets
a year, without benefit of court supervision. 69 And creditors seem to have
sufficient control over less trustworthy assignees through their powers of
removing the trustee and of placing the estate in bankruptcy. Should their
confidence be misplaced, additional remedies are available. If any default
has been committed, the surety on the assignee's bond may be held.70 And
since any assignee, common law or statutory, is a trustee and therefore sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of equity, a dissatisfied creditgr may bring suit as a
cestui to force an accounting before the equity tribunal."' As long as credi-
CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 3469; VT. PUB. LAWS (1934) § 2557. In Colorado,
court review may be waived with the signed consent of all creditors. COLO. Coup. LAWS
(1921) § 6266. It must also be remembered that twelve states have no operative assign-
ment statutes at all.
66. See, e.g., N. Y. DEErOR & CRmITOR LAW, art 2, § 15 (11). In courts with a
smaller amount of business, the services of the referee are often dispensed with.
67. See STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 71.
68. Cf. Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1177, 1189.
69. STRENrTHENING OF PRocEDUm, oP. cit. supra note 4, at 68.
70. If the assignee is in default, recovery may be had against him (Wilkins v. Barnes,
110 Conn. 379, 148 Atl. 132 (1930)] and the surety on his bond [Neely v. Cairo City
Nat. Bank, 150 Ky. 512, 150 S. W. 679 (1912)] to the same extent as against any
other trustee. He is liable for administrative expenses [Keystone Pipe Co. v. Zweifel,
127 Tex. 392, 94 S. W. (2d) 412 (1936)], fraud and failure to exercise reasonable dili-
gence and good faith in accomplishing the purposes of the trust. Champion v. Common-
wealth, 228 Ky. 794, 15 S. W. (2d) 1003 (1929); I re Stone's Assignment, 220 Iowa
1341, 264 N. W. 604 (1936).
71. Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank v. Peterson, 5 Cal. (2d) 601, 55 P. (2d) 867
(1936) ; In re Wheeler's Estate, 287 Pa. 416, 135 At. 252 (1926); First Nat. Bank v.
Bell, 125 Ore. 598, 268 Pac. 63 (1928); Pennsylvania Trust Co. v. Billman, 61 F. (2d)
382 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1932).
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-tors possess the right to equitable relief when desired, compulsory account-
ing, with its attendant expense, seems unnecessary.
Of course, without mandatory and painstaking investigation, occasional
defaults may go undetected. It nevertheless seems practical to wink at the
probably small loss caused by the fraud of an unsuspected assignee, when
dividends in the great majority of honest assignments will be so greatly
increased by the abolition of compulsory accounting. Perhaps the best way
of solving the problem would be to require the assignee to send a detailed
summary of his stewardship to all participating creditors, together with a
notice of his application for a discharge. Then, unless within a brief period
a creditor filed a motion for a court hearing,72 and posted a bond, the judge
or clerk would terminate the trust, and set the assignee's fee in the manner
prescribed by statute.
While most states require the judge to allow a "reasonable compensation"
for the assignee,73 others more judiciously set a fixed percentage limit of
from five to ten percent of the liquidated asset value.74 The result of the
latter method should be to force prospective assignees to select their risks,
and reject those estates which are so dissipated that adequate compensation
cannot be obtained. A ten percent fee, the charge usually made by a com-
petent, non-profit adjustment bureau,76 does not seem exorbitant, especially
if the superfluous toll exacted by the referee could be eliminated by doing
away with a mandatory accounting.An accounting cannot be dispensed with when, within four months of
the assignment, the assignor is put into bankruptcy, and the assignee is
compelled to transfer the estate to the receiver or trustee. Since the occa-
sion for bankruptcy is usually lack of confidence in the assignee, a strict
investigation into all of his activities is essential.70 Several district judges
have minimized the cost of the examination by denying the assignee any
compensation when irregularities are found in his conduct. 77 It has also
been suggested that the bankruptcy act be amended to permit the trustee in
bankruptcy to recover directly from the assignee all disbursements made
72. Cf. CAL-. Crv. CODn (Deering, 1937) § 3469; VT. Puu. LAws (1934) § 2557.
73. See, e.g., KAN. GEr. STAT. AwN. (1935) § 60-1346.
74. See, e.g., An DIG. STAT. (Crawford& Moses, 1919) § 493 (10%); N. Y. Dmroao
& CmmrroR LAw, art 2 § 21 (5%) ; NV. VA. CODE ANN. (1937) § 3946(16) (5%).
75. Billig, op. cit. supra note 2, at 310.
76. See Hagar, General Assignments and the Bankruptcy Law (1917) 27 YItz L J.
210, 216. State court approval of an assignee's account does not eliminate the necessity
of an auditing by the federal tribunal, should bankruptcy intervene. Matter of Neubarger,
Inc., 233 Fed. 701 (S. D. N. Y. 1916), aff'd, 240 Fed. 947 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
77. In re Polansky, 41 F. (2d) 547 (S. D. N. Y., 1930). See also Hagar, supra note
76, at 218.
A suspected assignee is rarely permitted to continue as trustee in banlwuptcy. See
STENGTHI NrG OF PRocEDUM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 73, 74; Comment (1937) 46 YAL.E
L. J. 1177, 1186, n. 50.
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by the latter which the court does not approve.78 At present, such action
can be taken only by a cumbersome plenary suit.79
Realization on Assets. Even when a competent liquidator has been selected,
his powers may be inadequate to enable him to administer the estate effi-
ciently. Considerable difficulty may be encountered in recovering assets that
have been disposed of before the execution of the assignment. While any
creditor may sue to recover property which a fraudulent assignor has con-
cealed or transferred to others,80 the power to sue is usually denied to the
common law assignee. He cannot regain secreted assets unless they are ex-
pressly mentioned in the assignment deed from which he derives his author-
ity.81 Nor can an assignee for creditors set aside a fraudulent transfer by
a suit against the transferee, for the rights of any assignee against a third
party are traditionally subject to all defenses which the third party has
against the assignor.82 Similarly, although creditors may overcome an un-
recorded mortgage, the assignee is helpless.8 3 While it is always possible
that a single creditor may bring a bill in equity to restore the fraudulent
conveyance to the general estate, a claimant alert enough to take such action
would usually prefer to levy at law upon the property and retain as much
as is necessary to satisfy his claim in full.8
4
Fifteen states" therefore confer authority upon a statutory assignee to
regain any transferred or secreted assets which a creditor would be able to
recover.86 Even if the fraudulently transferred assets already have been
78. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, Op. cit. .supra note 4, at 75, 76.
79. it re Jack Stolkin, 42 F. (2d) 829 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
80. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AcT, §§ 9, 10.
81. The assignee's title and powers are strictly delimited by the terms of the assign-
ment instrument. Seibert v. Milligan, 110 Ind. 106, 10 N. E. 929 (1887).
82. Moore v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380, 238 Pac. 81 (1925); Comment (1936) 45 YALE
L. J. 504, 509. Contra: Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 188 Wash. 635, 63 P. (2d) 359 (1936). The Washington court has been very
liberal in its interpretation of the common law assignment, implementing the common-
law assignee with most of the powers possessed by a trustee in bankruptcy.
83. Beard v. Herndon, 84 Okla. 142, 203 Pac. 226 (1921). Contra: McMinn v. Har-
rison, 93 Colo. 5, 23 P. (2d) 944 (1933), (1933) 47 HARv. L. REV. 346. See Comments
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 504, (1933) 6 RocxY Mr. L. REV. 70.
84. A creditor has this power under § 9 of the UNIFORm FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
AcT.
85. ARiz. REV. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 184; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1926) § 28-313; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) § 84; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9788;
NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) § 6-130 (if two-thirds of creditors consent) ; N. J. REV. STAT.
(1937) § 2:34-15; N. Y. DEBTOR & CREDITOR LAW, art. 2, § 15-6 (if court permits);
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 1611; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1926) § 11106;
PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 39 § 71; S. C. CODE (1932) § 9107; TENN. CODE ANN.
(Williams, 1934) § 7788; TEX. ANN. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 268; W. VA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) §3946(13); WIs. LAWS (1937) c. 431 § 128:19-2.
86. There is some dispute whether or not the statutory authority gives the assignee
power to upset an unrecorded conditional sale. Compare Seaboard Citizens' Nat. Bank of
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recovered by an individual creditor, the assignee may under the statute step
in to recover the property and limit the levying creditor to a pro rata share. T
If the assignee is lethargic, any cestui of the trust may conduct the suit to
set aside the conveyance, provided he turns over the increment to the general
estate.88
Statutory implementation should go further than permitting recovery of
dishonest transfers and secretions after they are discovered. Before taking
any action, the assignee must have more than mere suspicion of the fraud.
Yet only a dozen states have progressed to the point of allowing examination
of the debtor under oath in summary proceedings8 0 It also would be ad-
visable to vest the assignee, like the bankruptcy trustee,00 with power to
examine creditors, suspected transferees, and other third parties.0
Aside from actual fraud, an estate may also be depleted by the creation
of a preference or lien before the assignee takes possession. Alert creditors
may have tied up the property, with or without the consent of the debtor,
by mortgage, payment, or execution in aid of a judgment, prior to the making
of the assignment. Since at common law the assignee is powerless to avoid
these priorities, eight states wisely follow the bankruptcy rule02 and destroy
Norfolk v. Spandorfer, 160 Va. 826, 170 S. E. 12 (1933) with In re Pellegrini, 248 App.
Div. 526, 290 N. Y. Supp. 774 (2d dep't 1936). As to the validity of an unrecorded con-
ditional sale against a common law assignee, compare International Harvester Co. v.
Poduska, 211 Iowa 892, 232 N. NV. 67, 71 A. L. R. 973 (1930) with Seattle Ass'n of
Credit Men v. University Chevrolet Co., 181 Wash. 390, 43 P. (2d) 46 (1935).
87. In re Wilson, 138 Iowa 225, 114 N. NV. 551 (1903).
Under these statutes, the title to the fraudulently conveyed property vests exclusive-
ly in the assignee immediately upon the execution of the assignment. Wis. LAws (1937)
c. 431 § 128:19. All pending suits by creditors to set aside the unlawful transfers are
abated by the assignment, and the assignee substituted as plainfiff. Num. CowP. STAT.
(1929) § 130.
88. E.g., Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) § 84. The creditor must first make a demand
upon the assignee that the latter conduct the suit. Tipton's Adm'x v. Ball, 256 Ky. 816,
77 S. NV. (2d) 50 (1934).
89. ARiz. REv. COD ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 185; CoLO. CouP. LAwS (1921)
§ 6262; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 17-116; IowA Conz (1935) § 12733; Kmr. GzN.
STAT. ANN. (1935) § 1322; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) § 83; NEa. Coxp. STAT. (1929)
§ 6-134; N. Y. Dmrron & CasrroR LAw, art. 2 § 16; Tax. ANN. Rzv. COv. STAT. (Ver-
non, 1925) art. 272; UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 5-0-13; NV. V. COna ANN. (Michie,
1937) § 3946(14) ; iVs. LAws (1937) c. 431 § 128:16.
90. Bankruptcy Act, §21a, 30 STAT. 552 (1898), 11 U. S. C. §44(a) (1934).
91. Some statutes already permit such ex-amination. Im. STAT. ArNr. (Burns, 1933)
§ 17-166; KA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (1935) § 1322; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) § 83; Tro.
ANN. Rr-v. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 272. But the usual rule is to the contrary.
In re Miller, 144 Wash. 202, 257 Pac. 392 (1927).
Arizona and Nebraska have adopted the further precaution of declaring that an assignor
who fraudulently conveys or conceals assets is guilty of a felony. Axuz. Ray. CoD= Aim.
(Struckmeyer, 1928) § 186; NEB. Comu. STAT. (1929) § 6-145.
92. Bankruptcy Act, § 67, 30 STAT. 564 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 107 (1934).
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such preferences and liens varying the time period from one to four months.93
The assignee is given authority to bring suit for recovery of the property.
The assignee's powers may also be insufficient to allow him to liquidate
the assets of the estate advantageously. When the validity or amount of a
claim of the estate is in dispute, the assignee, like any other litigant, must
weigh the risk and expense of a lawsuit against the advantages of a proffered
settlement. Since there is doubt as to the power of a common law assignee
to compromise claims,94 it would be desirable to grant him express statutory
authority. While in some states the ability to compromise is made subject
to the approval of the court,95 such a provision provokes delay. And since
sufficient precautions can be taken to secure a competent and bonded assignee,
his powers of negotiation should not be hampered by making it impossible
for him to offer definite terms.96
When all the property has been reduced to the possession of the assignee,
it must rapidly be converted into cash, for otherwise mounting administra-
tive expenses will consume a substantial portion of the proceeds. But quick
liquidation is usually impeded by statutes which require notice to creditors
of all sales, and the consent of the court and public bidding for each disposi-
tion.97 These provisions may tend to forestall fraudulent conveyances, but
only at the cost of impairing the efficiency of honest sales. Such safeguards
are superfluous when the assignee is trustworthy,98 and when assignees are
unscrupulous they are rarely permitted to go so far as liquidation and sale
before removal by vote of creditors or by a petition in bankruptcy.90 Since
the assignee is generally required to post a bond of double the 'alue of the
assigned estate and can be made to account to the court before he is
discharged, 00 creditors would lose little by the elimination of these cumber-
93. NEB. Conp. STAT. (1929) §6-143 (1 mo.); N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) §2:34-2
(2 mo.); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 1611 (4 mo.); PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 39 § 71 (4 mo.); R. I. Gm. LAws (1923) § 5896; S. C. CODE (1932) § 9107
(3 mo.); TmN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 7788 (3 mo.); Wis. LAws (1937)
§ 128:07 (4 mo.). Wisconsin has copied the bankruptcy rule word.for word,
94. See Taylor v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 14 Tenn. App. 538 (1931). But cf.
Champion v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 794, 15 S. W. (2d) 1003 (1929).
95. Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) § 94; Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 5668; N. M.
STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 7-151; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1926) §11120.
96. No specific court approval is necessary in several states. NEB. Cornp. STAT.
(1929) § 6-138; N. 3. REv. STAT. (1937) § 2:34-14; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit.
39 § 76. Cf. W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1937) § 3946 (9). For a similar suggestion in
bankruptcy practice see Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1177, 1202, n. 158.
97. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (1935) § 60-1334; IoWA CODE (1935) § 12743;
Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 5659; N. Y. DEBTOR & CmIToa LAW, art 2, §§ 12, 19.
98. Adjustment bureaus liquidate over $20,000,000 of assets per year, with negligible
court control. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 68.
99. See pp. 953, 949 supra.
100. See p. 954 supra.
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some requirements. 01 Should outright repeal be thought undesirable, it
might be provided that a majority of creditors, when satisfied with the
assignee, could file a written waiver of all requirements as to publicity,
notice, and court consent.' 02
WINDING UP OF THE ]ESTATE
Distribution of Dividends. The ultimate objective for creditors is the re-
ceipt of their share in the assets of the debtor. While most of the problems
encountered in payment of dividends center about the same conflict between
the necessity for rapid liquidation and the cumbersome control which must
be imposed upon the assignee in order to safeguard the general body of
creditors, still a third complicating consideration -fairness to individual
creditors- appears in connection with the filing and allowance of claims
against the assigned estate. In order to wind up an estate expeditiously,
some time limit for filing claims must be set. 03 But the common law assign-
ment may not be able to move swiftly except where creditors are in substan-
tial agreement and none of the asserted debts are in dispute, for at least
one court has invalidated as unduly coercive a stipulation in a common law
assignment that all claims not submitted before a certain bar date would be
void. 04
Statutes require that claims must be detailed, under oath, and accompanied
by all evidence of the debt. 0 5 The. time period varies from one to twelve
months, 06 but many states permit late creditors to come in afterwards upon
motion to the court.0 7 Others firmly adopt the bankruptcy rule,108 denying
any relief to the dilatory, and permitting the assignee to allow claims and
commence distribution of dividends as soon as the time limit has passed.' 03
101. Cf. FLA. Coup. GEN. LAws ANN. (Skillman, 1927) § 6757. Compare the bank-
ruptcy recommendations made in DoNovAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 32.
102. Cf. CoLO. Coup. LAws (1921) §6266; Nma. Coip. STAT. (1929) §6-120. The
Chandler bill contains a similar provision. Comment (1937) 46 YA. L J. 1177, 120..
In West Virginia, a sale of property at a price less than 75% of its appraised value
is subject to the summary authorization of a "commissioner of accounts," who is charged
with all administrative duties which are usually handled by the court in other states.
W. VA. CoDE Am . (Michie, 1937) § 3946(9).
103. See, e.g., N. Y. Dmaro & CaDrrOR LAw, Art. 2, § 5. Generally, notice of the time
for filing claims must be given.
104. Turner v. Dress Hardware & Furniture Co., 207 11o. App. 557, 227 S. IV. 1035
(1921).
105. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) §3946(6); WXs. LAws (1937)
c. 431, § 128:14.
106. Compare NEB. Coup. STAT. (1929) § 6-116, with ALA Coor ANN. (Michie,
1928) § 10398.
107. See, e.g., N. J. Rzv. STAT. (1937) §2:34; OHIo GEN. CoDE (Page, 1926) § 11134.
108. Bankruptcy Act, § 57n.
109. See, e.g., MIcH. Coup. LAws (1929) § 13603; NV. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937)
§ 3946(6).
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But since the bar date in many states is within four months of the execution
of the assignments, forestalled creditors may obtain their revenge by imme-
diately petitioning the debtor and the assigned estate into bankruptcy. It
might be advisable, despite the delay, to extend the time for filing claims
beyond the critical period when bankruptcy proceedings threaten.
The procedure for allowing claims is fairly uniform, and somewhat similar
to the bankruptcy system.11 0 Preliminary decisions are usually made by the
assignee, subject to review in court, where any creditor may object to the
allowance or disallowance of particular items."" The losing party may then
appeal.112 It is the red tape dnd cost of such proceedings which have to a
large extent fostered the growth and judicial toleration of assignments made
outside the statute. While it may not be possible to eliminate entirely the
time-consuming judicial review, in order to expedite the process, additional
burdens should be placed upon the appealing creditor. The decision of the
assignee should be declared final unless the aggrieved claimant filed notice
of appeal within ten days and posted a bond to cover costs.113 The court
should then decide the dispute in a summary manner. And since there
would be no constitutional difficulty in denying an appeal from the judg-
ment of the district court, 14 a provision to that effect would be salutary.
Increase in dividends accruing from elimination of delay would more than
compensate for any possible injustice to individual creditors." 51
For a holding that a claim is invalid if filed with the clerk of court instead of with
the assignee (as required by statute), see In re Lounsberry, 208 Iowa 596, 226 N. W.
140 (1929).
110. Bankruptcy Act, Chapter IV. The new West Virginia procedure is most analo-
gous to the bankruptcy method of hearings before a referee. In that state, a "Cominis-
sioner of accounts" presides and allows claims, with the customary appeal to the court.
W. VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1937) § 3946(6) (13).
111. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (1935) §§ 60-1324, 5, 6; Tsx. ANN. R-v. Civ.
STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 269.
112. NEn. Con,. STAT. (1929) § 6-119.
113. Compare N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) §2:34-52; Wis. LAws (1937) § 128:15.
114. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505 (1903); Dohaney v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362
(1930).
115. The substantive law of allowability of claims closely parallels bankruptcy doc-
trine. A debt incurred by the assignor after execution of the assignment is not provable
against the assigned estate. Langford v. State Bank of Harrodsburg, 251 Ky. 633, 65
S. W. (2d) 730 (1933). Nor does a lienholder who files a claim with the assignee there-
by lose his lien. West Hudson County Trust Co. v. Wichner, 121 N. J. Eq. 157, 187 Atd.
549 (Ch. 1936). See enerally Legis. (1932) 20 VA. L. Rav. 222. For a suggestion that
state rules of allowability must agree with bankruptcy law, see In re Brock, 312 Pa. 7,
166 Atl. 778 (1933).
Before dividends can be distributed, rent and other charges incurred during the ad-
ministration of the estate must be paid off as prior liens upon the assets, as in bankruptcy.
Armstrong v. Lone Star Refining Co., 20 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). Statutes
regulate the order of distribution, usually giving priority to taxes and wage claims. WIs.
LAWS (1937) c. 431 § 128:17(1).
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Discharge of the Debtor. While the creditor's interest in an assignment
focuses on the dividends he is to receive, the debtor's main purpose is to
secure a release from his obligations.""0 It is not seriously disputed today
that a debtor Who makes an honest assignment of all his property should
be discharged from all his debts. Yet under present statute and case law
there is no way in which he may be released except vith the express consent
of every creditor. Assignments often end with the debtor's filing a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy in order to obtain a complete discharge, when the
purpose of the friendly adjustment was to avoid the necessity of bankruptcy
in the first place.117 State statutes are today powerless to grant a complete
release, for reasons which are explicable only in the light of the history of
insolvency legislation.
Prior to 1898, a federal bankruptcy act existed only during sporadic
intervals, and never for more than eleven years at a time." 8 The great
majority of debtors' estates were handled by state courts pursuant to com-
prehensive insolvency statutes. These enactments provided for voluntary and
involuntary liquidation, and for discharge of the debtor. Often embodied in
the same chapter of laws were statutes regulating assignments, to which the
discharge provisions were equally applicable.110 The National Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 was deemed to sweep away the conflicting provisions" 0° of all
such local laws,121 and there were many state courts which held that the
supervening federal power to legislate concerning insolvency was so per-
vasive as to destroy the assignment statutes as well,' especially when these
acts provided for a release.12 The Supreme Court did not go so far, but
decided that while the balance of the assignment laws were still in force,
the discharge provisions were suspended." 4 Though it was *conceded that
116. Some statutes also preserve to the debtor certain exemptions when he executes
his assignment. See, e.g., N. Y. DarOR & CREDrroR LAw, art. 2 § 4.
117. See SEVENGrENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 72.
118. See Hearings before the Committee on the Audiciary on H. R. 6439, 75th Cong.,
lst Sess. (1937) 8-16.
119. See, e.g., PA. STAT. AxNq. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 39; NVis. STAT. (1935) § 128.
120. "Both [state and federal statutes] cannot go on together, without direct and posi-
tive collision; and the moment that the bankrupt act does or may operate upon the per-
son or the case, that moment it virtually supersedes all state legislation." Storyj J. in
Ex Parte Eames, Fed. Cas. No. 4, 237 (C. C. D. Mass. 1842).
121. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819) ; Stellwegen v. Clum, 245
U. S. 605 (1918).
122. Harbaugh v. Costello, 184 Ill. 110, 56 N. E. 363 (1900) ; Cadwallader v. Shaw,
127 Me. 172, 142 AUt. 580 (1928).
123. Rowe v. Page, 54 N. H. 190 (1874) ; Pelton v. Sheridan, 74 Ore. 176, 144 Pac.
410 (1914). See Williston, Effect of National Bankruptcy Law on State Laws (1909)
22 HARv. L. REv. 547 (1909).
124. Pobreslo v. Boyd, 287 U. S. 518 (1933), which expressly approved In re Tar-
nowski, 191 Wis. 279, 210 N. W. 836 (1926). See also Packer v. Lehner, 115 N. J. L.
346, 180 Atl. 407 (Sup. Ct., 1935).
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the state could regulate the coimmon law privilege of making an assignment,
a release from all debts was said to be the essence of a bankruptcy act, and
the statutory discharge was deemed to tranisform the regulation into an in-
vasion of the federal power.
A common law assignor can attempt to secure a discharge through his
own efforts by providing in the assignment document that no creditor is to
share in the assigned estate unless he files a release for the unpaid balance.
.When it is further provided that after distribution to releasing creditors
the remainder of the estate is to be returned to the debtor, such an instru-
ment is usually declared fraudulent as to dissenters. 125 But if the assignor
relinquishes all interest, and the residue is to be shared by the non-consenters,
a majority of courts will uphold the assignment. 26 Since the preferential
feature is valid at common law, and the discharge provision rests safely
upon a contractual foundation, a statute 1 2 7 authorizing the debtor to execute
such an instrument would clearly be unobjectionable. 12  And while a state
act which released the assignor from debts owed to non-consenters would
apparently be invalid, the limitation may be unimportant. The great majority
of assignments made today contain a discharge clause usually unobjected to
by creditors. 129 A dissenter's only immediate revenge would be to throw
the estate into bankruptcy, where his dividends would probably be smaller,
while the debtor would still be entitled to his release.
125. Brekke v. Crewe, 43 S. D. 106, 178 N. W. 146 (1920) ; Barrett & Co. v. Chilton,
304 Mo. 679, 264 S. W. 802 (1924).
126. Beal Burrow Dry Goods Co. v. Baker, 136 Okla. 278, 277 Pac. 585 (1929);
Isaacson v. Davis, 127 Me. 398, 143 Atl. 788 (1928); First State Bank v. Allen, 151
Va. 93, 144 S. E. 474 (1928).
127. Such statutes exist in four states. ARiz. Rsv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928)
§178; S. C. CoDE (1932) § 9106; VA. CoDS ANN. (Michie, 1936) §5278d. Compare
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 39, § 100, with tit. 39 § 164, and annotations there-
under. That the Pennsylvania discharge provision is still in force, see In re McElwain,
296 Fed. 112 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat. Bank, 313 Pa. 467,
169 AtI. 209 (1933), cert. denied, 291 U. S. 680 (1934).
128. The Texas statute [TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art 263] auto-
matically reads a release as to consenting creditors into every assignment. While the
Texas courts have suspended this provision, they have at the same time permitted the
debtor himself to insert such a discharge clause into the assignment document, and have
barred dissenters from relief. Hajek & Simicek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S. W. 305 (1903).
This attitude has recently been approved by the United States Supreme Court, in an
opinion which indicates that local interpretation of assignment statutes will hereafter be
followed by the federal courts. Johnson v. Star, 287 U. S. 527 (1933), (1933) 42 YALE
L. J. 1140.
The Virginia and Pennsylvania discharge statutes [supra note 127] have been upheld.
See Fugate v. Allen, 153 Va. 143, 149 S. E. 501 (1929); In re McElwain, 296 Fed. 112
(C. C. A. 3d, 1924).
129. Communications to the YALE LAw JouRNAL from forty-three adjustment bureaus
located throughout the country, January 14-February 10, 1938.
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CONCLUSION
A model statute should not place too many restraints upon the assignee,
lest the greatest advantages of the friendly adjustment method be destroyed.
The power to put the debtor into bankruptcy is a sufficient and indeed the only
practical safeguard against fraud, for most of the statutory provisions aimed
at preventing dishonesty necessarily increase both the scope of judicial super-
vision and the time and money consumed by the assignment. Too close
court control resulted in defeat of the Hastings-Michener bill,130 which con-
tained a compulsory requirement that the assignee account. A similar criti-
cism may be levied at the pending Chandler bill. 3 A statute which elim-
inated the accounting requirement and reduced court control to a minimum
might fare better, although years of experience with cumbersome and ex-
pensive local statutes have conditioned the advocates of friendly adjustment
to a firm distrust of additional legislation. There would still remain con-
siderable room for improving the assignment statute by freeing the assignee
from onerous burdens and by vesting him with necessary powers. The lines
which such revision should take are outlined more fully below.
If statutory changes are desired, it may be questioned whether national or
local legislation would be the preferable alternative. A federal statute would
provide the advantages of uniformity, a competent judicial personnel trained
in the handling of bankruptcy cases, and the rounding out of a single nation-
wide systdrn of insolvency administration. One national bill might be easier
to pass than forty-eight state laws. Most important, Congressional action
alone could provide a complete discharge for the debtor, and prevent assign-
ments from being thrown into bankruptcy.
On the other hand, uniformity is not essential except from an artistic
point of view, for assigned estates are small and concentrated, and conflict
of laws problems seldom arise' 32 Since the object of an assignment is to
avoid judicial proceedings, the debatable superiority of the federal personnel
would not be too important. Incorporation of an assignment statute in the
bankruptcy act would automatically suspend state laws, and the inaccessi-
bility of federal courts in the larger western districts would make their
supervision of small estates too slow and costly. Furthermore local legis-
lation has made much headway during the past two years. The newly revised
statutes of Arizona, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin,'1  which in-
corporate many of the changes suggested in this discussion, are extensively
used by the local adjustment bureaus, with marked success. And, as has
been demonstrated above, a complete statutory discharge is probably un-
necessary, unless creditors are unusually stubborn.
130. See ST2ENGTHMEMNG OF PR0CoUE, OP. cit. mupra note 4, at 63.
131. See Comment (1937) 46 YALE L J. 1177, 1189.
132. No more than half a dozen cases have reached the digests in the last twenty years.
133. See note 14, rupra.
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Yet while other advantages of the two systems may cancel out, state statutes
cannot prevent an assignment from being an act of bankruptcy. The ever-
constant danger of a bankruptcy petition has been referred to in connection
with almost every problem involved in the operation of an assignment. But
if a federal amendment limited bankruptcy jurisdiction to those cases where
it is desired by a majority of creditors,184 supplementary reform could be
achieved equally well by either national or state legislation.
A suggested enactment should include eleven cardinal points:
1. All assignments should be filed with the court, and notice thereof sent
to all creditors. An unfiled assignment would not be void, but any creditor
could summarily force the assignee to comply with the statute.
2. Minimum qualifications should be established for the selection of a
bonded assignee, and creditors should be permitted to remove the debtor's
choice and appoint another.
3. The assignee should be given the power to set aside all fraudulent
conveyances which creditors can now avoid.
4. All mortgages, payments and other preferences and liens obtained
within four months of the assignment should be void, and the assignee
should be permitted to restore the property to the general estate.
5. The assignee should be permitted to examine the debtor and all other
interested parties under oath.
6. The assignee should be allowed to compromise disputes involving
rights of the estate.
7. The assignee should be given full discretionary powers of sale, except
perhaps when a major disposition is to be made.
8. A majority of creditors in number and amount should be permitted
to authorize a composition and continuation of the business.
9. All claims against the estate should be invalid unless filed before a bar
date. The assignee should then be permitted to pass upon claims, subject
to the review of the district court, from whose decision no appeal would be
allowed.
10. The assignee should not be required to account to the court except
upon petition of a creditor.
11. The debtor should be allowed to contract for an automatic discharge
from further liability to all creditors who have participated in the assignment.
134. See p. 950, supra.
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